As Israel generally believes, the trigger of the conflict between Israel and Lebanon is the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers. Israel’s rapid response to Hizbullah’s attack far exceeded Hizbullah’s expectations. The final conflict of interest is a typical representative of the fourth generation war.
Unlike previous conflicts between Israel and other Arab countries, the whole conflict has no decisive battle, no obvious winner and no obvious military conquest.
These characteristics are typical characteristics of the fourth-generation war, so the fourth-generation war can be defined as that the main participant in the war is a non-governmental actor (Hezbollah), and it is possible to deal with a technologically advanced country (Israel) in an internationally recognized country (Lebanon).
The fourth generation of war and peace is a new thing. Its origin can be traced back to Mao Zedong’s "people’s war", but the most important people are ignored by western professional soldiers. The purpose of this paper is to show that the conflict between Israel and Lebanon provides an example for our professional soldiers to study the evolution of war forms in the 21st century. In addition, perhaps more importantly, this prospect can provide reference for our army and help it better adapt to the future operational environment in terms of implementing regulations, recruiting personnel and preparing for combat.
As defined by William Linde (one of the founders of the fourth generation war theory) in his groundbreaking works, the fourth generation war includes the following elements:
A non-governmental base with a high degree of ideological unity; Using the current high technology; Decentralized logistical support; Directly attack the enemy’s culture; Comprehensive use of psychological warfare means, especially through the media.
As other authors have described, other generations of wars are divided from the perspective of technological progress and tactical occurrence. The first generation of war was marked by the development of line column combat formation and wireless bore rifle. The obvious feature of the second generation war is the linear operation based on indirect fire. The third generation of war is characterized by mobile tactics with circuitous and destroying enemy combat troops and defense in depth as the main actions.
More importantly, we must understand that the fourth-generation war may coexist with the second-generation war and the third-generation war, and the second Lebanon war is a good example. More importantly, it is difficult to distinguish between war and politics, combatants and non-combatants, peace and conflict, front and rear in the fourth generation war. The fourth-generation war cannot be confused with terrorist war and asymmetric war, although terrorism can be used as a tactical means (for example, Hamas’s suicide attack in the West Bank. )
Two factors need to be further discussed here. First of all, these non-governmental, ideologically inspired military organizations exist in a sovereign country. Secondly, these organizations use weak national governments to build bases for support, recruitment and combat. The second related factor is the important position of diplomacy, information and economy in the war. This does not mean that the strength of these countries did not play a role in the past wars, but in the fourth generation of wars, these different means have become increasingly integrated and assimilated. This is very effective for the technologically advanced and militarily powerful opponents. The main threats of the modern army include two factors, one is the cross-country organization driven by ideology, and the other is the comprehensive use of diplomatic, information, military and economic means. These points were very obvious in the second Lebanon war.
Linde’s theory on the fourth generation war has a strong guiding role in studying the second Lebanon war. Through several remarkable analogies, it can be inferred that the Israeli-Lebanese conflict is a typical example of future wars. The main feature of the fourth generation war is that it is driven by ideology and participated by non-governmental actors. Hezbollah plays such a role in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s ideology is mainly rooted in the Koran and the Islamic canon of Shia. The importance of this ideology lies in that from the perspective of Hezbollah, its main followers are not only Lebanese, but more importantly, Shiite Muslims and jihadists.
Hezbollah is more than just a military organization. Its actions have political legitimacy in Lebanon, and its political party holds 9 member seats and 3 non-member seats in the 2000 seats in the parliament. Through Iran’s funding and support, Hezbollah has gained the support of Sunni Muslims and Christians in southern Lebanon. Lebanon, with a population of about 3 million, is not a mono-ethnic country. It consists of about 18 different sects. In addition, its weak government and army provide a hotbed for cultivating non-governmental organizations such as Hezbollah.
Emerging technology
The second main feature of the fourth generation war is the use of high technology. The second Lebanon war provided us with many examples of using high-tech weapons. There is no doubt that the Israel Defense Forces and other Arab countries have strong military and technological advantages. In fact, when faced with overwhelming numerical superiority, this technological superiority in favor of Israel was subverted, as fully illustrated by the Yom Kippur War and the 1982 Lebanon War. Although the IDF has effectively used advanced technology, Hizbullah has not.
Technically speaking, rockets are not recognized as high-tech weapons. In fact, most of the rockets used by Hezbollah belong to the Katyusha rocket series of the former Soviet Union during World War II. Katyusha Rocket (BM-21) was originally designed to attack cluster targets and area targets, such as city centers. Because of their low accuracy, they are more psychologically destructive than military performance. The main technical knowledge they need is how to successfully acquire and use the wireless remote control launcher and how to obtain the target data from commercial satellites.
Another technical improvement of Hizbullah is that it effectively kept confidential communications throughout the conflict. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is famous for its ability to intercept and intercept enemy communications. Different from previous operations, Hizbullah successfully encrypted communications throughout the war to keep communications safe. This enabled Hizbullah to maintain a sound command and control function until the end of the war. We can’t know how Hezbollah did it from the public information, but there is no doubt that they may have used irregular devices or (and) encryption equipment.
Many IDF armored vehicles have been hit by the latest generation of anti-tank missiles provided by Syria and Iran. Among the advanced anti-tank missiles used by Hezbollah are Raad, which is an Iranian Sagger. Raad-T is an Iranian Sagger with front and rear warheads. Toophan is an Iranian ceramic anti-tank missile. These anti-tank missiles have been skillfully used tactically. Hezbollah has also used the latest rocket-propelled Grenade launcher made in Iran. This rocket-propelled Grenade launcher belongs to RPG-7 series. These advanced anti-tank weapons have dealt a precise blow to the world-recognized advanced armor.
Hezbollah has also successfully attacked Israeli missile ships. On July 14th, a missile guided by Iran’s C-802 radar hit the Israeli navy HANIT hard, while the ship was leaving Beirut, causing damage to the ship and four casualties.
Another main operational space for Hizbullah to demonstrate its technology is space. Hezbollah has used drones several times in recent conflicts. Perhaps this war is the first major war in which both sides use drones. Ababil UAV is developed and produced by iran air industry. Obviously, Hezbollah has used several advanced technologies to deal with Israel.
The third example is the use of decentralized logistics support facilities. During the period from 2000 to 2006, Hizbullah developed an integrated logistics system scattered in hundreds of residents and public facilities (including mosques) in southern Lebanon. This network consists of a large number of underground vertical bunker systems, widely distributed storage and replenishment, and concealed pits for weapons and ammunition. These infrastructures are designed to cope with Israel’s large-scale all-out war. These reinforced infrastructures enable Hizbullah to achieve one of its main strategic goals, which is to continuously attack Israeli civilians with rockets.
Psychological influence
The second Lebanon war fully demonstrated that attacking the opponent’s culture is another principle of the fourth generation war. Unsurprisingly, most media reports focused on the overwhelming rocket shells that hit Israeli cities. In fact, most of the casualties on both sides are civilians, which is not what Israel wants, but what Hezbollah wants. Because Hezbollah knows that most western societies, especially Israel, hate civilian casualties, they want to seek a quick solution to the conflict by attacking Israeli civilians. The psychological effect of rocket attacks on Haifa and southern towns is enormous, which makes Israel have to shorten the combat time as much as possible, so that the IDF cannot achieve its operational objectives.
The last proof of the second Lebanon war as a typical example of the fourth generation war is the skillful application of the media as a means. Which side can make good use of the mass media will control the opinions that affect the world. Hezbollah, more precisely Iran, fully realized that "the whole world is paying attention", and they knew how to perceive the influence point of view, and carried out information warfare on two fronts. On the domestic front, Hizbullah uses Arab media such as Al Jazeera to gain support. In order to strengthen regional support, Hezbollah media showed pictures of destroyed IDF equipment, injured IDF soldiers and scrapped tanks. They spread some pictures of injured Lebanese civilians to western countries. This fully shows the sophistication of Hezbollah’s information action planners in target analysis.
The incident in Kfar Kana is a good example of how Hizbullah controls the media to support information operations. On the morning of the bombing, major news media networks all over the world were broadcasting videos sent by Al Jazeera from Kfar Kana, in which rescuers were searching for crushed children from the ruins of collapsed houses. About 28 people died, including women and children. In this incident, the Israeli side claimed that it was mainly caused by civilians returning to the building where the unexploded bombs of the Israel Defense Forces had fallen. The reason why Israel attacked Kfar Kana was mainly because it was the main place to launch Katyusha rockets, and as their consistent policy, they distributed warning leaflets to non-combatants before the air strike. This news has not been widely spread, and it has also been ignored by most media; Correspondingly, it also caused some losses. This fully demonstrates that Hizbullah has successfully applied the information space of the fourth generation war.
The second Lebanon war also fully demonstrated some other principles of the fourth generation war. For example, the differences between Lebanese combatants and non-combatants, front and rear, politics (diplomacy) and fighting, and unarmed victor and vanquished are no longer obvious. If the composition of the fourth generation war is correct, this conflict dominated by Islamic guerrilla forces needs to be carefully studied. Obviously, Shia guerrillas are better at post-modern warfare (the fourth generation war) than Sunni organizations such as al-Qaida.
Hezbollah has shown people that a small, dedicated force organized in a country with a weak government can produce strategic results. Israel’s leaders are caught in the trap set by Hizbullah, and they use ground forces that rely on non-contact operations and precision strikes slowly and dispersedly. In this way, due to the delay in the operation, Hezbollah can resist the initial attack of the Israel Defense Forces and use the strategic means of launching rockets into Israel. This method has correspondingly produced strategic effects. Hezbollah, an ideological non-governmental actor, can defeat the technologically advanced government state, which is a characteristic of the fourth generation war.
A preview of future conflicts
This war has some characteristics of the fourth generation war, so it can be used as a preview of future wars. A very remarkable feature is that Hizbullah can use relatively low-tech weapons and equipment (such as Katyusha rockets) to attack Israel’s relatively advanced precision firepower. The technical advantages of the Israel Defense Forces are offset by the scattered launch sites (orchards and urban areas) of Hizbullah and the use of remote-controlled launchers. This enables Hezbollah to directly attack Israeli towns, which is another feature of the fourth generation war. The inability of the Israel Defense Forces to completely destroy Hezbollah’s rocket ammunition depot is also a feature of this kind of war-scattered logistics infrastructure.
Despite the IDF’s command of space, Hezbollah’s rockets kept hitting it until the ceasefire. Related issues also include how Hezbollah effectively uses information means to support operations and achieve operational goals. Their control over the media is a good example of how perception can change or weaken the battlefield results. The information aspect of war can blur the boundary between politics and war. Finally, these characteristics are strikingly similar to the war in Iraq, using homemade bombs to offset high technology, flexible use of media, decentralized logistics, and non-governmental actors (Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds) in a weak government. We have to come to the conclusion that this is a dominant style of war in the foreseeable future.
The recent conflict means far more to us than the Israeli-Lebanese border.
Editor: Sun Jie
